Environmental sustainability is primarily an accounting challenge. If our economy fully accounted for all of the harm done by a good or service in its price, consumer incentives would drive environmental policy. This process is known as internalizing externalities.
The process of internalizing externalities is a difficult one, as it must be driven by government policy. Market-based mechanisms, such as a carbon cap-and-trade regime, can set prices or limits on certain types of emissions. Companies can be forced to pay for disposal of the hazardous materials in their products at end-of-life.
Such policies are extremely important for long-term progress on environmental issues but are also slow to be implemented, as they must wend their way through the political process. It’s satisfying, therefore, to find that there are other incremental improvements possible in alignment of consumer incentives with environmental sustainability.
One example is pay-as-you-drive insurance. The concept is simple—as drivers rack up more miles, their claim risk increases. Therefore, charge higher premiums to drivers who drive more miles.
This simple change in the car insurance business model has dramatic implications on consumer incentives. From an accounting standpoint, traditional insurance is a fixed cost and does not factor into any decision-making. As soon as this cost becomes variable, however, every incremental mile driven costs the driver more money. This incents drivers to drive less, reducing congestion, fuel consumption, and carbon emissions.
PAYD adoption is driven by simple self-reinforcing economics. Low volume drivers would be immediately incented to switch to PAYD—they would be the primary beneficiaries of the lower premiums. In response, traditional insurance providers would need to raise their rates because their average customer would now drive more miles. The cycle would repeat until all customers had shifted over to PAYD.
This phenomenon is a classic case of adverse selection. While the effects are muted because of the legal requirement to purchase insurance, the point still stands. If some insurance companies collect information relevant to pricing risk and others do not, these companies will always win. This portion of the Wikipedia article linked above is a particularly instructive analogy to life insurance:
Non-smokers, on average, are more likely to live longer, while smokers, on average, are more likely to die younger. If insurers do not vary prices for life insurance according to smoking status, life insurance will be a better buy for smokers than for non-smokers. So smokers may be more likely to buy insurance, or may tend to buy larger amounts, than non-smokers. The average mortality of the combined policyholder group will be higher than the average mortality of the general population. From the insurer’s viewpoint, the higher mortality of the group which ‘selects’ to buy insurance is ‘adverse’. The insurer raises the price of insurance accordingly. As a consequence, non-smokers may be less likely to buy insurance (or may buy smaller amounts) than if they could buy at a lower price to reflect their lower risk. The reduction in insurance purchase by non-smokers is also ‘adverse’ from the insurer’s viewpoint, and perhaps also from a public policy viewpoint.
Furthermore, if there is a range of increasing risk categories in the population, the increase in the insurance price due to adverse selection may lead the lowest remaining risks to cancel or not renew their insurance. This leads to a further increase in price, and hence the lowest remaining risks cancel their insurance, leading to a further increase in price, and so on. Eventually this ‘adverse selection spiral’ might in theory lead to the collapse of the insurance market.
To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers (to the extent that laws permit) ask a range of questions and may request medical or other reports on individuals who apply to buy insurance, so that the price quoted can be varied accordingly, and any unreasonably high or unpredictable risks rejected.
I thoroughly expect PAYD to become the norm once the tracking technology and privacy concerns are worked out. It’s very satisfying when simple, profit-maximizing changes in business models have positive environmental consequences.